Primary-selected MP Sarah Wollaston engaging with her constituents. Photo by Sustainable South Brent via Flickr.

On August 4^th 2009, British politics experienced a quiet revolution as Sarah Wollaston became the Conservative candidate for Totnes. Unlike any other party candidate before her, Wollaston was chosen through an open primary which involved all Totnes constituents.

Open primaries are best understood as “democratising” candidate selection by giving non-party members a chance to decide the kind of candidates they would like to see as future MPs. This has two seemingly positive consequences.

Through directly involving constituents, open primaries may reinvigorate public faith in representative democracy by producing candidates who are directly representative of and accountable to their constituents. Open primaries could increase this faith: although there are no polls to show how much Wollaston’s constituents trust her, broadly positive media coverage from local papers implies her constituents approve of her more than the average MP.

Furthermore, open primaries could eliminate “lobby-fodder” safe seat MPs who are infamous for their obedience to the whip. If the dominant party in a safe seat were to hold an open primary, this would force the dominant party’s candidates to engage with the whole constituency. In order to win the nomination, candidates would likely have to become more moderate and take an interest in local issues. Whilst this wouldn’t solve the problem of party dominance in a constituency, it would give all constituents a say in the type of Labour or Conservative MP they return to Parliament.

In a recent article for the Spectator, Alex Massie seems less convinced of this, arguing that although “primary challenges to sitting MPs might make some members nervous […] most of the time it would have little impact on the strength of party representation at Westminster”. Massie’s argument assumes that party candidates selected and elected through open primaries have equal incentive to follow the party line. Yet it has been well documented that candidates selected through primaries owe their position to their constituents, and act accordingly. Wollaston has rebelled on 4.1% of the bills she’s voted on and turned down a PPS job because she thought it was “a Faustian pact: in return for the vague illusion of having the minister’s ear, I would have had to […] always vote with the government”. Undoubtedly, open primaries could radically change safe seat MPs.

The apparent appeal of open primaries has led to some promises from the government and opposition to trial their adoption across the UK. Recently, Ed Miliband announced the Labour London mayoral candidate for 2015 will be chosen through a closed primary in light of Unite’s supposed influence over Labour’s Falkirk candidate. Moreover, the 2010 coalition agreement promised to “fund 200 all-postal primaries over this Parliament, targeted at seats which have not changed hands for many years”. So why have open primaries all but disappeared from the governmental agenda? And why, if at all, should we care?

Ostensibly, the first question is easy to answer. Open primaries would take the power of candidate selection away from parties and party activists and give it to constituencies. Candidates selected would owe their position to their constituency, rather than their party and would be likely to vote against the party line if it conflicted with their constituents’ views. As it’s not in the interest of parties to create a system which fosters rebellious MPs, it’s not surprising the major parties want to distance themselves from open primaries. However, taking a less cynical view, there is still a case to be made against open primaries and the transformative effect they have on governance. Which brings us to the second question: we should care because open primaries could generate radically new candidates, methods of passing bills and restore public faith in government.

While Wollaston’s broadly positive reception indicates that open primaries promote faith in representative democracy, comparison with the US suggests this may not necessarily be the case. In May 2013, Congress’ approval rating dwindled at 16%; however, the average approval rating for individual congressmen was at 46%. This paradoxical phenomenon is best explained by open primaries’ tendency to produce politicians who are effective at representing their constituency, but less effective at dealing with national issues – it’s unlikely open primaries will genuinely help reinvigorate public faith in representative democracy.

Furthermore, by forcing a closer link between candidates and their constituents, open primaries weaken party ties which are often helpful in passing major bills. This often leads to two (potentially undesirable) outcomes. Firstly, it can lead to the legislature not passing the bill. Secondly, it can lead to compromises and money being spent on projects entirely irrelevant to the bill, so that individual legislators are willing to support it.

Contemporary US politics offers many examples to support this analysis: perhaps most infamously, the congressional member for Pennsylvania, John Murtha is estimated to have steered $2 billion to his constituents between 1992 and 2007.The prevalence of pork-barrel spending scandals in the US illustrates how undesirable weakening party ties and strengthening politicians’ ties to constituents can be.

Whilst it could be objected the UK has fewer distinct regional interests which would press for pork-barrel spending, Danny Alexander’s recent behaviour shows our politicians are just as Machiavellian as congressmen. It’s not unforeseeable that MPs would see pork-barrel spending as a huge re-election advantage in the same way congressmen do – Wollaston has admitted she enjoys “lobbying shamelessly” for constituents.  It could also be objected that polarised Democratic and Republican ideologies and the permanent campaign associated with frequent congressional elections explain the difficulty of passing bills and prevalence of pork in the modern-day US. But these factors shouldn’t mitigate primaries’ role in intensifying the difficulty of combining localised constituent and national interests. A slower legislative process with potential for frequent gridlock and pork-barrel spending may seem unappealing, but could well become a reality in the UK if open primaries become widespread and the power of party diminishes accordingly.

Moving candidate selection from parties to constituents will come at the expense of national efficiency in passing legislation. Additionally, claims that primaries reinvigorate public faith in representative democracy and lead to better MPs ought to be tested with evidence before they are believed. US and (limited) UK experience of primaries shed light on the transformative effects of primaries. Proponents of primaries would do well to pay some attention to it.