Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution. Photo by Pasu Au Yeung via Flickr

Of all the places in the world associated with political instability and popular revolution, Hong Kong probably comes quite far down on the list. Until recently, the city had developed a reputation as ‘apolitical’ and heavily materialistic. Behind the imposing skyscrapers lining Victoria Harbour, Hong Kong has become a seething cauldron of anger directed against the gradual erosion of its autonomy and staggering levels of income inequality.

In just over a decade, Hong Kong politics has become increasingly polarised, with young people feeling alienated from Mainland China and the values of the Communist Party. Pro-business moderates are finding themselves marginalised by hardline neo-Communists who fervently believe in an ‘ever-closer union’ between Hong Kong and the Mainland. The city’s insular politics have long been divided into two main camps known as the ‘pan-Democrats’ and the ‘pro-Establishment’, both of which are broad coalitions incorporating a range of political parties from across the conventional left-right spectrum. Ever since the Governorship of Lord Patten in the late 1990s, the primary debate in local politics has been that of universal suffrage and the degree of influence that Peking ought to have over Hong Kong’s internal affairs. Technically speaking, the city is a ‘Special Administrative Region’ of China enjoying full autonomy over all aspects of its affairs except for foreign policy and external defence. In reality, both the legislature and executive are controlled by the Communist Party in defiance of popular opinion, since a consistent majority of 60% of the population have supported the pan-Democrats in every election since the late 1980s – an appropriate parallel would be to imagine David Cameron granting Scotland total autonomy but reserving the right to appoint 55% of all Members of Scottish Parliament as well as the entire Scottish Executive.

Yet, truly worrying is how C.Y. Leung’s administration is using the protests as an excuse to move the city closer towards a police state. Apart from using tear gas against domestic protestors for the first time since the riots of 1967, during which pro-Communist terrorists (some of whom are now prominent members of the government) launched a bombing campaign against the colonial government and local moderates, extrajudicial beatings and unconstitutional strip searches have been systematically carried out by the police over the past few days. The last remaining pan-Democrat newspaper was physically blockaded earlier this week, damaging its commercial viability, especially as leading firms (including British banks such as HSBC and Standard Chartered) have already been pressured into pulling their advertisements. Pan-Democratic lawmakers have been arrested for bringing equipment back to their offices purely on suspicion of ‘abetting illegal behaviour’, while student leaders were kept in solitary detention without just cause. Instead of responding to the legitimate grievances of peaceful protestors, the government has resorted to bribing Hong Kong’s powerful triads and persuading them to attack protest encampments in full view of the local and international media. The apparent frontrunner to succeed C.Y. Leung is a former Security Minister notorious for her hardline approach towards protestors and avid peddling of conspiracy theories.

The room for consensus is shrinking by the day as China seeks to evade its legal obligations towards the people of Hong Kong, who have been repeatedly promised genuine universal suffrage. In recent weeks, a handful of moderates have called for protestors to return home in exchange for beginning negotiations with the government, which were abruptly cancelled a few days ago. Put bluntly, Hong Kong’s youth have had enough of a deeply corrupt status quo whereby a handful of pro-Chinese businessmen reap monopoly profits through vast conglomerates permeating every aspect of daily life in the absence of meaningful competition laws. – the city currently sits atop the Economist’s crony-capitalism index, ahead of Russia, Ukraine and Mexico. Indeed, Chief Executive C.Y. Leung openly declared his opposition to universal suffrage on the grounds that it would grant excessive power to the bottom 50% of the population, for which he has been compared to Mitt Romney by Paul Krugman.  It is to their immense credit that the protesters thus far have remained essentially peaceful and have carefully calibrated the demonstrations in such a way as to maintain pressure on the government without actually disrupting the daily routines of most citizens. With only three (normally congested) tunnels and two underground lines connecting the two main parts of the city, it would have been all too easy for students to totally shut down all business and trade if they really wanted to do so.

However, the Chinese government is in no mood for any sort of compromise, and negotiations will achieve, at best, cosmetic concessions. The student protestors and their supporters across Hong Kong should maintain their resolve and reject any proposal that will restrict electoral choice. Universal suffrage and regular elections are meaningless in the absence of genuine competition – President Putin was ‘democratically’ elected, but hardly anyone considers his Russia to be a truly democratic country. Ever since 1997, Hong Kong has lived under an abnormally tolerant authoritarian regime, but for all its glamour and civic liberties, it remains at its core a dictatorship, its leaders lacking any kind of popular legitimacy. With the legislature powerless and marginalised by the current series of events, the students on the street represent the city’s last and perhaps best hope. The moderate opposition has tried to negotiate with China for the best part of 30 years, and all it has to show for its efforts is a continuous erosion of the city’s civic liberties and autonomy.

When Britain handed back Hong Kong to Peking in 1997, it did so based on the belief that it had constructed a system of legally binding guarantees that would ensure the city’s freedom for at least 50 years. Instead, the Chinese Communist regime has systematically broken these promises to the point that an overwhelming majority of Hong Kong’s people are now demanding their rights. With 60% of the city’s population rejecting Peking’s proposal, the only way forward for the protestors and their allies in the legislature is to ride this wave of popular anger and veto any proposal that fails to comply with international electoral standards. By ensuring that any future government in Hong Kong will lack popular legitimacy and reminding the international community of this fact, the youth who continue to bravely resist an increasingly violent police are able to cause China a considerable degree of embarrassment. Already, there are growing signs of popular dissent in China’s teeming cities as workers protest against a unaccountable government and staggering levels of income inequality. Hong Kong might once again be able to play its historical role as the incubator of revolutionary ideas for the rest of the country. As long as the protestors are able to keep up the  momentum, time and history is ultimately on their side. Accepting a deeply flawed compromise will only strengthen the Chinese leadership and consign Hong Kong to political, social and economic oblivion.

Indians march during the 2014 election. Photo by gordontour via Flickr.

The BJP’s victory, as expected, was comprehensive. The sheer scale of that victory was underestimated, perhaps, and the defeat of Congress and her allies puts the Hindu party and other members of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in a position of unassailable strength. As India’s 7^th decade draws near, Narendra Modi has the opportunity to be a fulcrum, placing her back on the map as a political power.

The fears raked up by the Western media and Congress party that Hindu fanatics would cut down Muslims and other minorities has failed to materialise, and the internal strength of India looks set to grow rather than collapse in the future. Nevertheless, there are worrying signs from members of the government that more hard-line views have not disappeared entirely. Health Minister Harsh Vardhan commented that Western sex education should be banned, and questioned the use of condoms in fighting HIV. In a nation where strong sentiments surrounding ‘Western corruption’ are easily whipped up by politicians seeking the mandate for backwards decisions, this is a troubling note, if still one which has received backlash from within India. Discourse surrounding celibacy often play into the bizarre Madonna-whore complex which prevails across India, creating an atmosphere of misogyny which allows so much damage to be done to the female populace. How far Modi will have to pander to the conservative groups is questionable, but in India – a nation where police can be bribed, talked around, or simply overwhelmed by numbers – unofficial groups remain a persistent threat. It is telling that village militias are fighting Naxalite (Communist) rebels in order to supplement police forces.

Modi’s first moves on the international stage have proven interesting, with the various leaders of the ASEAN nations attending his inauguration. India’s long-lapsed position as a major regional power has not been returned through this alone, but it has certainly shown a contrast to the previous government’s position. The release of fishermen by both Pakistan and Sri Lanka – actions with limited precedent in recent times – suggests that their governments, neither who have great love for India, feel that Modi is less of a push-over than the Gandhi regime. Whilst Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has offered to make moves on the constantly delayed peace process, the recent attack on Karachi Airport demonstrates the power that Islamist groups exert over India’s neighbour. The continuing return of bodies of jawans, infantrymen, from the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kargil, offers another potential obstacle to a return to normality.

Economically, a return to strength may well prove even more difficult. The upcoming loss of Carrefour reveals an almost atavistic idea of self-sufficiency. Trading on the Mahatma’s idea of swadeshi, self-sufficiency, the barring of most multinational corporations may well frighten foreign investors and threatens to remove India from the BRIC. At the same time, in addition to a boost in popularity amongst its more conservative supporters, India truly has an opportunity to advance national business. More optimistic ideals for a growth in family-run corner shops is unlikely to materialise, however, as major retailers like Reliance look set to continue their strangle-hold over the retail sector. Reliance’s chairman, Mukesh Ambani, came under fire from the protest party, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), during the election – they alleged that through deals with the government surrounding the rights to natural gas, Reliance was given a favourable rate to the considerable detriment of the public.

Rumours about Reliance’s move into the production of civil and military aircraft, however, will be welcome news in many quarters. India’s military equipment programme has been wrecked by scandals, often as a result of procurement from foreign companies. The Agusta-Westland scandal was received with considerable acrimony for its termination of British jobs, but the history of corrupt middlemen supplying faulty or over-priced equipment has been a hallmark of previous governments. India’s own weapons programmes have proven seriously backwards to boot. The INSAS rifle, the workhorse of the infantry, is up for replacement. Discarded at times in favour of AK47s used by the enemy or informally procured, the new weapons programme may well take years to fully implement. Despite Modi’s triumphal induction of INS Vikramaditya into the navy, the shadow of the sinking of the INS Sindhurakshak last year remains heavy. Docked in Mumbai, still unexplained explosions on the 14^th of August, the night before Indian Independence Day, saw the submarine sink in the crowded harbour, killing 18 crewmen. Although the exact cause remains to be found, faulty equipment seems as likely a reason as the “inadvertent mishandling of ammunition” stated by the official report. If India is to draw in a new era of regional power, it is going to need an army which can stand its ground and equipment which will not let it down.

India stands at the cross-roads of history and it must decide if it will advance or fall. There are varied paths down which it can fall – collapsing into the corrupt state which it already half-resembles, and which Pakistan has perfected. Alternatively, the threat of Hindu fundamentalism lingers at the margins, in the villages and towns where the rule of law is less stringent – it is not impossible that it could push itself into the forefront of politics. If Narendra Modi can steer the state on a path which offers prosperity for all, galvanises a poorly-tuned workforce, and shows neighbours and distant powers alike that India will no longer take their slights without a whimper, he may just leave a grand legacy for the largest democracy in the world.

Protesters at Sa’naa University. The dialogue has made concerted attempts to involve youth in refashioning the political landscape. Photo by AJTalkEng via Flickr.

Abed Mansour Hadi has somehow managed the impossible. The unassuming president of long-suffering Yemen has gotten his country into international headlines, without any mention of child brides or drone strikes. In the last few months, Yemen has found itself lauded with unusual praise, most of it directed at Hadi’s pet project, the ongoing National Dialogue Conference. The conference, which began in March, is in steady progress towards a constitutional revision and likely restructuring of the state. For a country once deemed likely to fail after the 2011 Arab revolutions, this has come as a genuine surprise, as Yemen now seems poised to surge ahead of its once-hopeful regional neighbours, Egypt and Syria, in achieving the promise of the Arab Spring.

Such a turnaround would have been unthinkable a year ago. Hadi was viewed as a stand-in for his brutal boss, former strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the country was widely seen as a failed state waiting to happen, with a restive south likely to break away. But it was the critics who were surprised when the dialogue finally got underway in March this year. Of the dialogue’s 565 participants, 30% were women, and groups with a history of enmity with the government, such as the Southern separatists and Northern Houthi movements, were invited to participate. The Dialogue boasted a wide range of individuals from every conceivable walk of life – academics, civil society activists, youths and rural workers – instead of a mere line-up of staid government officials. Even more surprising were the compromises the government seemed willing to make. To appease reticent, distrustful Southern leaders, the government promised them 57% of the seats in Dialogue meetings – a number far beyond the 30% of the population they represent. In an interview with Al-Sharq al-Awsat, a pan-Arab newspaper, Hadi committed himself to a dialogue that “does not exclude any partisan, political, cultural and sector of society”, and promised to “restructure the armed forces and security services”. These promises seem largely kept; in particular, Hadi’s expulsion of Saleh’s own son, Ahmed Ali, from the feared Republican Guard seems to hint at a genuine clean break from the tainted legacy of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC).

Southern comfort

Still, as significant as his initiatives have been, Hadi is a long way from restoring legitimacy to his government. Saleh remains the nominal head of the ruling party, and his loyalists continue to dominate other areas of government, a fact which continues to deter other parties from participating fully in the conference. So while the dialogue has achieved astonishing progress, it would be foolhardy to assume that a few months of talks can persuade Yemen’s fractious groups to work together for the common good.

Nowhere is this more telling than in Yemen’s long-running southern conflict, perhaps the most divisive of all the issues on the table. Despite Hadi’s reconciliatory overtures, analysts warn that the dialogue might not accomplish anything beyond a sense of goodwill, with no party willing or able to discuss the deeper issues that underlie the desire for separatism. “We have not gotten to a solution,” admitted Abdulghani al-Eryani, a political advisor to the dialogue. In fact, Saleh recently took to television (on his privately owned channel, Yemen Today) to slam the government for agreeing to a federal state system, which would give the restive southerners more autonomy. The South’s leaders exhibited behaviour that was not much more encouraging; their largest faction leader, Mohamemed Ali Ahmed (regarded in some southern circles as a criminal), has walked out of the conference with his Al-Hirak movement, blaming the Sa’naa government for “foot-dragging”.

While these untimely disruptions may have cost the dialogue some credibility, the real problem facing dialogue participants is that the elusive reconciliation they seek will require much more than a simple commitment to federalism. Observers have noted that in the quieter meetings, negotiators from both the GPC and the pro-Islamist Islah (the two main groups fighting for a centralised state) have admitted that real power needs to be devolved to the South, and a new regional framework will require a fairer distribution of Yemen’s scarce resources, particularly water basins. Helen Lackner, an expert and observer in Yemen, warns that measures might need to go even further. According to Lackner, Southern separatism stems not from a dubiously-defined Southern Yemeni identity, but from a long history of distrust with the northern government. Much of Yemen’s politics rests on a complex network of tribal and familial relationships, and as president, Saleh was instrumental in cultivating it for his own ends. Under a ‘divide and rule’ policy, followers were lavishly rewarded, while opposing tribes, such as the Ahmar family (who fought the government in a violent 2011 conflict) and the Houthis, another group with separatist intentions, were met with the full force of the state,. A few months of talks will not undo this distrust, and with a discussion on the constitution set to follow the conference, the South will expect substantive change to a federal structure that currently appears to favour the North.

To succeed, therefore, the conference must undertake the hard work of rebuilding capacity and confidence in state institutions, while involving regional and tribal leaders in redesigning the current governate borders. This means that the dialogue will need to be even more inclusive than it already is (the balance of power in most committees still seems to lie with the GPC elite), and it will need to focus on more than just the Southern issue, but also the moribund state of the economy. There is lingering popular conern over state corruption that is keeping donor money (over $8.1 billion in promised funding) away, and a broken system of food and water supplies that causes Yemen to be wholly dependent on wheat imports. If Hadi is to win over the South, he will need to prove that he can deliver on the issues where his predecessors failed.

After years of neglect and misrule, Yemen has finally captured international attention for a brave new start. But contrary to the popular perception, the hard work has only just begun. If Yemen is to escape the spectre of state failure that has already begun to plague its neighbours, Hadi’s government must build on the momentum which they created at the start of this conference, and take the bold steps Yemen needs to stay in the spotlight.

69% of MPs feel a pay rise is justified. Photo by RS Deakin via Flickr.

Those who ply their trade within Westminster remain among the most beleaguered parliamentarians in the world today. In a political landscape mired by cynicism and mistrust, the Independent Parliamentary Standards Agency’s proposal to raise MPs’ salaries in Britain by £8,000 was received by most as ill-judged and offensive. In light of public sector pay freezes for the past two years, an increase to £75,000 per year for our parliamentarians prompted a predictably vitriolic response from the febrile fourth estate. Yet, equally predictably, the story is far more complex.

When placed within the context of a wider discourse on the role of parliamentarians and their previewed worth, it would seem that sober introspection is required on behalf of the electorate. Ian Kennedy, the chairman of IPSA has been accused of lacking political acumen, yet there must always surely be more to political intelligence than a mere appreciation for “good PR”. In an age where politicians have fewer resources than ever and yet must match record levels of expectation, we must ask ourselves whether we retain our cathartic pessimism towards parliament: often unsatisfactory, but a dependable absorbent for a nation’s negativity.

Deeper analysis of IPSA’s proposals shows that the changes would cost the public purse a mere £500,000 extra a year, as rises in salary would be largely offset by alterations to pensions, severance pay and allowances. This is a Faustian pact of, at worst, modest proportions. Westminster MPs remain undeniably underpaid as their Australian counterparts earn twice as much and US Congressmen are paid the equivalent of over £100,000 a year. Singapore is noteworthy in that it also pays its MPs the equivalent of over £100k whilst ranking first in the world for public trust in politicians and transparency of government policy, according to the World Economic Forum. (Admittedly this is a nation which has been described by writer Sue Ann Tellman as exhibiting “happy-faced fascism”.)  Drawing from these examples, it appears to be axiomatic that by paying parliamentarians a more rewarding salary, greater efficiency and immunity to corruption are gained. Of the small handful of countries that pay their MPs less than Britain, only Switzerland stands out as one that displays  similarly laudable characteristics to Singapore. Yet among the other countries, Spain is parsimonious in offering a salary of £27,000. Corruption is second only to unemployment on this nation’s political agenda.

There can be little sense in maintaining such a low paid legislature. Lloyd George knew this in 1911 when he introduced an annual stipend, diversifying parliament beyond the reserve of the wealthy and entitled.  The age of the professional politician had seemingly begun, and yet over a century later we continue to show nostalgia towards philanthropic amateurism within parliament. This sentiment may be admirable on the one hand, but it is surely a misguided anachronism. Low pay for MPs results in a distracted and privately wealthy parliament. When the cost of running a constituency campaign is around £10,000, and many professionals such as lawyers and doctors would take a significant pay cut on entering parliament, the status quo remains, whereby becoming an MP necessitates considerable personal wealth. The predominance of the rich amateur politician is yet to be undercut. A more professional and diverse parliament is an aim listlessly championed by many, but the leaders of all the main parties have condemned the recommendations of the appropriate independent body.

As a consequence we have entered an absurd Dutch auction between our political parties. As Clegg denounced the proposals as “potty’” all parties are promising to deliver our national politics as cheap as the next. Whilst a YouGov poll shows that 69% of MPs feel the pay rise is justified, their leaders are unwilling to present the reasoned argument in favour of a rise. This however is no failing of our political elites; it instead represents a sad indictment of the frenzied attitudes taken towards politicians in which fear of reprisal results in necessary convictions being forsaken for what is deemed palatable.

The tropes of greed and scandal in Westminster have created a bashful cohort of MPs, 232 of whom operate under the spectre of an expenses scandal which occurred before they even entered parliament. The legacy of the expenses scandal, a consequence of underpaying our representatives, is not just a deep mistrust of MPs, but the creation of the very body whose proposals we now seemingly find so abhorrent. The punishment continues, but the true lessons from that scandal have not been learnt.

The political discourse remains one of cynicism and despondence. The Hansard society, dedicated to promoting parliamentary democracy around the world, found that MPs spend on average 69 hours working a week, excluding travel, and yet the motif of a half empty chamber (at times when MPs are too busy with constituency work to attend sessions) heralds moronic accusations of apathy. We want our politicians to be poorly paid and yet immune to bribery; come with real world experience yet have no “past”. Our politics is truly debased and hysterical.

Representative liberal democracy is, quite rightly, an expensive luxury. A rise in salary for our chastised MPs is not a reward, although such remuneration could easily be justified. On the contrary the proposals represent a significant step towards a more focused, professional, and representative parliament where the often inappropriate secondary incomes of MPs could be curtailed and personal wealth would no longer be a prerequisite for entering political office. Salaries of MPs are aptly shown by the global experience to shape not only the character of the political class but also the quality of a national legislature. Acceptance of IPSA’s proposals however is far from likely in a political culture imbued by frenzy, where public attitudes and the media which helps form them are so hostile to our representatives. The necessary cessation of cynicism remains unlikely at present. The road towards a healthier politics has been shown by Mr Kennedy to begin with a sober self-reflection on the part of the electorate. Liberal democracy does not come cheap.

Primary-selected MP Sarah Wollaston engaging with her constituents. Photo by Sustainable South Brent via Flickr.

On August 4^th 2009, British politics experienced a quiet revolution as Sarah Wollaston became the Conservative candidate for Totnes. Unlike any other party candidate before her, Wollaston was chosen through an open primary which involved all Totnes constituents.

Open primaries are best understood as “democratising” candidate selection by giving non-party members a chance to decide the kind of candidates they would like to see as future MPs. This has two seemingly positive consequences.

Through directly involving constituents, open primaries may reinvigorate public faith in representative democracy by producing candidates who are directly representative of and accountable to their constituents. Open primaries could increase this faith: although there are no polls to show how much Wollaston’s constituents trust her, broadly positive media coverage from local papers implies her constituents approve of her more than the average MP.

Furthermore, open primaries could eliminate “lobby-fodder” safe seat MPs who are infamous for their obedience to the whip. If the dominant party in a safe seat were to hold an open primary, this would force the dominant party’s candidates to engage with the whole constituency. In order to win the nomination, candidates would likely have to become more moderate and take an interest in local issues. Whilst this wouldn’t solve the problem of party dominance in a constituency, it would give all constituents a say in the type of Labour or Conservative MP they return to Parliament.

In a recent article for the Spectator, Alex Massie seems less convinced of this, arguing that although “primary challenges to sitting MPs might make some members nervous […] most of the time it would have little impact on the strength of party representation at Westminster”. Massie’s argument assumes that party candidates selected and elected through open primaries have equal incentive to follow the party line. Yet it has been well documented that candidates selected through primaries owe their position to their constituents, and act accordingly. Wollaston has rebelled on 4.1% of the bills she’s voted on and turned down a PPS job because she thought it was “a Faustian pact: in return for the vague illusion of having the minister’s ear, I would have had to […] always vote with the government”. Undoubtedly, open primaries could radically change safe seat MPs.

The apparent appeal of open primaries has led to some promises from the government and opposition to trial their adoption across the UK. Recently, Ed Miliband announced the Labour London mayoral candidate for 2015 will be chosen through a closed primary in light of Unite’s supposed influence over Labour’s Falkirk candidate. Moreover, the 2010 coalition agreement promised to “fund 200 all-postal primaries over this Parliament, targeted at seats which have not changed hands for many years”. So why have open primaries all but disappeared from the governmental agenda? And why, if at all, should we care?

Ostensibly, the first question is easy to answer. Open primaries would take the power of candidate selection away from parties and party activists and give it to constituencies. Candidates selected would owe their position to their constituency, rather than their party and would be likely to vote against the party line if it conflicted with their constituents’ views. As it’s not in the interest of parties to create a system which fosters rebellious MPs, it’s not surprising the major parties want to distance themselves from open primaries. However, taking a less cynical view, there is still a case to be made against open primaries and the transformative effect they have on governance. Which brings us to the second question: we should care because open primaries could generate radically new candidates, methods of passing bills and restore public faith in government.

While Wollaston’s broadly positive reception indicates that open primaries promote faith in representative democracy, comparison with the US suggests this may not necessarily be the case. In May 2013, Congress’ approval rating dwindled at 16%; however, the average approval rating for individual congressmen was at 46%. This paradoxical phenomenon is best explained by open primaries’ tendency to produce politicians who are effective at representing their constituency, but less effective at dealing with national issues – it’s unlikely open primaries will genuinely help reinvigorate public faith in representative democracy.

Furthermore, by forcing a closer link between candidates and their constituents, open primaries weaken party ties which are often helpful in passing major bills. This often leads to two (potentially undesirable) outcomes. Firstly, it can lead to the legislature not passing the bill. Secondly, it can lead to compromises and money being spent on projects entirely irrelevant to the bill, so that individual legislators are willing to support it.

Contemporary US politics offers many examples to support this analysis: perhaps most infamously, the congressional member for Pennsylvania, John Murtha is estimated to have steered $2 billion to his constituents between 1992 and 2007.The prevalence of pork-barrel spending scandals in the US illustrates how undesirable weakening party ties and strengthening politicians’ ties to constituents can be.

Whilst it could be objected the UK has fewer distinct regional interests which would press for pork-barrel spending, Danny Alexander’s recent behaviour shows our politicians are just as Machiavellian as congressmen. It’s not unforeseeable that MPs would see pork-barrel spending as a huge re-election advantage in the same way congressmen do – Wollaston has admitted she enjoys “lobbying shamelessly” for constituents.  It could also be objected that polarised Democratic and Republican ideologies and the permanent campaign associated with frequent congressional elections explain the difficulty of passing bills and prevalence of pork in the modern-day US. But these factors shouldn’t mitigate primaries’ role in intensifying the difficulty of combining localised constituent and national interests. A slower legislative process with potential for frequent gridlock and pork-barrel spending may seem unappealing, but could well become a reality in the UK if open primaries become widespread and the power of party diminishes accordingly.

Moving candidate selection from parties to constituents will come at the expense of national efficiency in passing legislation. Additionally, claims that primaries reinvigorate public faith in representative democracy and lead to better MPs ought to be tested with evidence before they are believed. US and (limited) UK experience of primaries shed light on the transformative effects of primaries. Proponents of primaries would do well to pay some attention to it.

The helmet and flack jackets of UN peacekeepers. Photo by United Nations Photo via Flickr.

To nurture peace and to build stable democracy in post-conflict countries, United Nations’ peacebuilders have stepped their boots into post-conflict soil with two supplies: an olive branch for peace and a blue helmet for democracy. Unfortunately, from the international community’s launching of twenty major peacebuilding missions after 1989, peacebuilders have produced plausible success in achieving peace but have also presented sobering failures in selling democracy to post-conflict leaders.

Why have post-conflict democratic transitions been difficult to establish? Answers may come from examining peacebuilding as a dealership, meaning peacebuilders and leaders of post-conflict countries sitting at a table and discussing the benefits and costs of a democratic reform package. On one end, post-conflict leaders, the buyers, see democratic transition through two lenses—either as providing benefits such as international recognition, financial resources, or as threatening their political seats. It is crucial to evaluate the motivations of these leaders when examining the success and failure of peacebuilding missions.

When local leaders meet with peacebuilders, an infinite number of concerns are on their minds. Some of these include how much aid the peacebuilders will provide, how strong the peacebuilding mission is, and even how will their neighbors react. However, two more important variables are security, and political appetite. Because democratization opens the door for elections and mass media, leaders may be afraid that democratic reforms will threaten their security by fueling mass movements, riots, or civil wars. Since norms of good government restrict the leaders’ ability to exploit state resources, many are afraid that their empires built on illegal economic activities such as drugs, arms, and humans will vanish. Fearing results from the ballot box, local leaders worry that democratic elections may cause them to lose their political seats. Finally, post-conflict leaders worry that by subscribing to the democratic package, this will disrupt the only bedrock on which their authority rests its shoulders on—the patron-client network where leaders hand out state jobs or public goods in exchange for political votes.

Taking into account these concerns, peacebuilding missions will be examined in three different political situations.

Afghanistan: unstable and undemocratic

Since 9/11, forces led by the UN have rushed to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda, while putting into place institutions that could effectively rule the country based on laws, not on personal power. The international community tried to sell its democracy plan to President Hamid Karzai, head of the central government, but faced major opposition from former Taliban commanders, who threaten Karzai’s central state and who operate within their provinces. These local leaders feared that a democratic, centralized state would cut short their networks of power.

Fearing for his own security, Karzai was stuck between powerful provincial leaders and the pressure of the international community. He abandoned democratic reform and instead has strengthened the patronage network that is the standing support for his limited presidential authority, while provincial leaders continue to make millions from opium trafficking.

With Afghanistan plagued by massive poverty and the Taliban, its increasingly inefficient and shaky regime continued to be supported by the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan. Peacebuilders are afraid that if they scare the leaders by further democratization, and threatening to remove troops and/or aid, Afghanistan’s security will worsen. With statebuilding for democracy standing to a halt, Afghanistan has, indeed, become what Freedom House labels as a “Not Free Country.”

Rwanda: stable and undemocratic

Between 1990 and 1994, Rwanda was entangled in a civil war rooted in economic and political crises but fought alongside ethnic lines. The overwhelmingly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who invaded from neighboring Uganda, hoped to overthrow the Hutu-led government. Although the UN tried to institute peace and democracy there, Rwanda’s war ended in military victory with the RPF assuming political power in July 1994, forming a broad-based government emphasizing national unity and ethnic inclusion.

To become credible in the eyes of the international community, RPF looked to consolidate peace, stability, and security. However, they worried that democracy would only threaten their country’s security, especially in the wake of the 1994 genocide. They also feared that they would lose their absolute military victory, which gave them political power in the first place, to another party. Furthermore, as long as RPF resist the peacebuilders’ deal towards democratization, RPF soldiers, who committed crimes during the 1994 genocide, cannot stand trial.

After RPF’s victory in 1994, the UN peacebuilders struck a deal with RPF that reflected, more or less, both of their wishes: peacebuilders accepted RPF’s security priorities while the RPF promised to adhere to the Arusha Accords, which ended the civil war. In agreeing to partial terms, the leaders were able to maintain links with donors, using them in the struggle to retain power. Between 1993 and 1997, 42% of Rwanda’s GDP came from outside aid. The international community fears that if they were to pull out their funds, Rwanda would have another outbreak of violence. By Freedom House’s terms, Rwanda, too, is a “Not Free Country.”

Mozambique: stable and democratic

When its sixteen years of civil conflict ended in 1992, Mozambique saw itself successfully transition into a peaceful and democratic state. This was in major part due to the partnership between the Mozambique Liberation Front, or Frelimo, and the Mozambique National Resistance, or Renamo. They believed that the only way to stop the conflict from continuing was to share their power between themselves.

Frelimo and Renamo went ahead with close talks with the UN operation in Mozambique, which acted as the referee of the peace process. By winning the founding election and becoming the running party to this day, Frelimo earned stable legitimacy. Renamo supported the democratic process as an opposing, legitimate party because the alternative was to become a marginalized contender in an unwinnable war.

Even though both parties understood the link between international aid and multiparty democracy, they embraced democracy quite differently, based on their own political appetites. The Frelimo government, who feared losing power, set its preferences to stability and sustaining power. After all, being the ruling party since independence, they had the resources, history, and experience to gain from a centralized, presidential system. But Renamo, the main opposing party, had their aims set to becoming a legitimate, formal political party. Renamo expected the international community to provide them with money in order to fund their goal of maximizing power within the Mozambican government.

Analyzing The Three Dealerships

To have success in postwar democracy, transition depends upon strong local leaders’ demand for democracy, which is a product of low costs to local leaders. Often the costs of democracy are too high, and peacebuilders do not end up swaying the post-conflict leader’s interest, whether that is by military power or by adding resources. Instead, peacebuilders often compromise with the leaders, leaving the country in the post-war status quo. While peacebuilders can bring combat to an end, they can rarely build a liberal, democratic, and self-sustaining government when the post-conflict leaders show no support for it.

This situation might be rectified if scholars and activists started to examine the many motives of post-war countries’ leaders that influence the democratic outcome. Then the peacebuilders, representing the international community, might sit down and rewrite the rules of the democratic game.

This article builds on original research, conducted by Christoph Zürcher, Carrie Manning, Kristie D. Evenson, Rachel Hayman, Sarah Riese, and Nora Roehner. See

Daniel Golobiewski holds a BA from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, at the City University of New York.

Popular opposition – but who’s listening? Photo by cristineagoe via Flickr.

Fracking, “a technique used to break apart the dense shale rock, releasing the hydrocarbons (like gas and oil) contained inside”, is a controversial practice. It has sparked public opposition throughout the world and has been banned in countries such as France and Bulgaria for its potential consequences on human health and the environment. Yet some European politicians have been getting hot under the collar about fracking when politically convenient – and then forgetting all about it when it is not. Romania is a perfect illustration of such politically expedient see-sawing.

In 2011, when in opposition, current Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta’s Social Democratic Party (PSD) proposed a draft law demanding a complete ban on fracking, complaining that no studies had been conducted and no legislative framework to regulate the technical conditions for exploring and exploiting shale gas. Yet after gaining power, the PSD-led government rejected its own previously proposed law. Entirely contradicting his previous position on fracking, in January 2013 Prime Minister Ponta emphasised that exploiting shale gas should be treated as a positive solution to increase Romania’s energy independence, since the country continued to pay the highest price for gas compared to Bulgaria, Hungary and other Eastern European countries.

While the Romanian public has amply, repeatedly and ardently opposed fracking and called into questions its government’s moves, the government does not seem interested in responding to its critiques and fulfilling its demands. This situation calls into question the extent to which popular protests can ultimately ensure government accountability, while underscoring the fact that officials might prefer to pursue economic interests at the expense of their voters’ desires, their health and the environment.

In March 2013, Ponta went one step further, affirming that he is in favour of authorising shale gas exploration, and exploitation under appropriate environmental standards, in what he described as an effort to ensure Romania’s energy independence from Russia. Ponta stated: “First, Romania needs to confirm its shale gas resources. We should allow preliminary exploration of the reserves, a process which could take around five years. After that, any future shale gas development should be in compliance with all European and global environmental standards.”

Yet the reality of fracking would hardly be so straightforward. Romanian law does not differentiate between conventional resources, such as coal and gas, and non-conventional resources, such as wind and solar power, and has no procedures to evaluate the impact that shale gas exploration and exploitation can have on the environment.

Despite this, not only has Romania conceded 2.2 million acres to the U.S. energy company Chevron to start exploration drilling, but in May 2013 the Romanian Environment Protection Agency issued shale gas exploration permits to Chevron for two areas situated near the Bulgarian border. These permits allow the company to conduct controlled explosions at a depth of 10 and 15 meters on an area of 1,800 square kilometers, and the company intends to create its first test wells during the second half of 2013. The Romanian government’s support for fracking was further boosted during a recent European Council Summit, when Council President Herman Van Rompuy announced “shale gas could be part of the energy mix in a number of [EU] countries”.

The Romanian population has vehemently and repeatedly protested against their government’s decision to encourage fracking. In Costinesti, one of the conceded regions, 94 percent of the population voted against fracking in a local referendum. Throughout 2012 and 2013, over 8,000 Romanian citizens have come out to protest. In April 2013, meetings and marches were held in many Romanian cities. The protesters decried the government’s lack of transparency and information on the exploration projects. In a sign of solidarity, on May 2013, Bulgarians from the city of Dobrich also organised rallies against fracking in Romania, which would have an impact on their country. In June 2013, Bulgarians crossed into Romania to join their neighbours’ protest against drilling plans. Thousands of Bulgarians themselves had led anti-fracking protests in 2011 and 2012, calling on their government to place a moratorium on fracking.

The Romanian public’s opposition to fracking is part of the global controversy surrounding the practice. The European Parliament issued a report pointing out that the chemical additives used in fracking include “toxic, allergenic, mutagenic, and carcinogenic substances”. Indeed, a popular petition, signed by almost 15,000 Romanians and demanding the banning of fracking in Romania, argues that in areas where fracking has been used the number of grave diseases, including asthma, leukemia, skin cancer and peripheral neuropathy, is sharply on the rise as a result of consuming water from exploitation areas and breathing in contaminated air. And the method of exploring shale gas is no less dangerous than that of extracting them, because advanced exploration also uses fracking, with the only difference being that of scale.

Several European countries have already rejected the practice. France was the first European country to ban fracking in 2011. In 2012, Bulgaria adopted a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing and immediately revoked an exploration permit previously granted to Chevron, invoking insufficient proof of the environmental safety of the practice. The Bulgarian government’s decision came partly in response to the widespread anti-fracking protests held by concerned Bulgarian citizens. Similarly, Denmark, Holland, Ireland and the Czech Republic imposed moratoriums on fracking. In the U.S., several states, such as New York, have also placed moratoriums, while Vermont has banned it altogether.

However, many state governments in the US mirror the unresponsiveness of Romania. Ohio was a site of protests with hundreds or thousands of participants, and over 100,000 Californians signed a petition urging a fracking ban. Just as in Romania, these protesters’ demands have remained unanswered by their representatives. After using Romanians’ protests against fracking to its own advantage while in opposition, the new Romanian government is now turning a deaf ear to the same public. The Romanian government, much like its US counterpart, seems to have forgotten its responsibility to respect and reflect the wishes of its population, expressed numerous times through protesting and referendum. The government has yet to realise that exploiting shale gas only postpones the needed strategic and sustainable shift to renewable energy – and thus that its greatest focus must be developing renewable energy sources for Romania.

Graffiti in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, following the fall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Photo by Denis Bocquet via Flickr.

Democracy was born in Ancient Greece, fell asleep, and awoke centuries later with a glorious cry. She learned to speak in the thick of coffee houses— even before she could walk, and took up arms in the gardens of Versailles. She has since sailed the seven seas on ships of commerce and war. Though stained in blood, Democracy stood victorious in the end and has become the patroness of freedom and prosperity. But the 21st century is one of uncertainty, and this suggests that we question the efficacy of established notions.

The ongoing economic and financial crisis puts the liberal democracies of the West under enormous pressure. U.S. bi-partisanism and European particularism—not to mention the adventures of Silvio Berlusconi—have led one to question the worth of democracy as a model for development in periods of crisis. Conversely, China’s relatively smooth hand-over of power last year and continued economic success has provided an alternative to the Washington consensus: the Beijing consensus. The events prior to and following the Arab Spring, however, illustrate the inherent fragility of the authoritarian alternative. Now how do lions enter this tale?

Three East African countries have witnessed remarkable economic growth in recent years: averaging 8.1%, 7.4%, and 9.7% over the previous five years. These countries are Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia, respectively, and have accordingly been termed as African lions, following the example of Asia’s tigers. Such growth figures far surpass the 4.6 percent average of Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia have also all made a habit of imprisoning critics, censoring the media, intimidation and torture.

Africa’s lions are ruled by political strongmen: Paul Kagame has called the shots in Rwanda since 1994, Yoweri Museveni has been in power in Uganda since 1986, and Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, who just recently passed away, acted as Prime Minister from 1995 to 2012. Freedom House, an independent watchdog advocating for democracy, ranked Rwanda and Ethiopia in their 2012 report as not free, and Uganda as partly free. According to the report, the situation in Uganda has in fact worsened in the last year, while economic growth increased. Is democracy a luxury that developing countries simply cannot afford?

There is a strong cross-country correlation between democracy and income, but no evidence of causal effects. Instead, a 2008 study by Acemoglu et al concluded that: “Omitted historical factors appear to have shaped the divergent political and economic development paths of various societies, leading to the positive association between democracy and economic performance.” Historical factors may also explain why democracy is often inadequate in a developing country context. Consider the following: national boundaries are drawn arbitrarily by colonial agents and a national identity never gained ascendancy over an ethnic or religious one.

Electoral democracy does not easily function in a deeply segmented society, as is frequently the case in Sub-Saharan Africa. A prime example of ethnic favoritism is Kenya, where in the most recent elections 98 percent of all Luo votes went to the candidate of that tribe. Against the backdrop of highly fragmented societies, some experts have argued that single party rule is the only immediate remedy for the pervasive ethnic divides in Rwanda and Uganda. There certainly exist benefits to reducing power struggles between political parties and doing away with election cycles: chiefly, enlightened leaders can direct greater attention towards pressing issues in achieving development.

The catch, however, is that authoritarianism has historically not proven itself a liable alternative to democracy. Post-independence Africa witnessed a myriad of strongmen who seemed to have meant well at the beginning, yet led their economies into fiasco and, while falling, tore a countless number of people with them. Sadly, the majority of these leaders began as champions of liberation struggles against colonialism, but with power they themselves became the hands of oppression. Take the example of Robert Mugabe. The promising future of Zimbabwe was piece by piece dismantled during the 1990s and 2000s by a number of disastrous economic policies that were naturally complemented by political repression. Authoritarian rule is cursed by arbitrariness – Willkürherrschaft – which stems from the unilateral decision-making of one man or political group.

The legitimacy of any government boils down primarily to the relationship with its people, i.e. the social contract. Democracy is a comprehensive synthesis of political institutions—a way of organising a government. In its ideal state, democracy demands competition for political power, inclusive political participation, leaders can be held accountable, the rule of law is enforced, and where people share a culture of democracy, accepting that democracy is “the only game in town”. But there is no assurance of prosperity. In authoritarianism, on the other hand, the ruler promises his people stability and prosperity in return for compliance—or rather, obedience. It is when the social contract is broken that government’s either fall, mostly by force, or turn to oppression.

In the short to medium term, democracies may falter and autocracies may progress, especially in countries with weak institutions and where periods of protracted political and economic crisis undermine people’s belief in democratic governance. But because every government is bound to its citizenship via a social contract, authoritarian regimes are inherently instable. Such regimes promise prosperity in return for compliance, but past experience has shown that economic growth goes through stages of booms and busts. This pattern is likely to persist even with sound economic policies due to the complexities of the world economy and the increasing economic integration heralded by globalisation. Thus, with economies bound to experience impasses, the social contract is bound to fail. And when it fails, institutions need to exist that saturate discontent rather than suppress it. For the suppression of thought attacks the universal right of the individual: the right to livelihood, to dignity, to self-respect. Protecting, respecting, and promoting human rights makes sense, not only for the sake of long term political stability and social peace but also economic development.

Democracy therefore continues to be understood in Western thought as “the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried”—à la Winston Churchill. But the complexities of currents within countries have time and time again given rise to achievements that have questioned the efficacy of established notions. And while the economic success of Africa’s lions – Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia – has instigated a more recent debate on the relationship between democracy and development, it has not changed the fact that authoritarianism is inherently coupled by repression: the unsustainable dogma of history.

Elias Kühn von Burgsdorff is studying for a Bachelor’s degree in Economics and History at McGill University, Montreal. This article originally appeared on our partner website, Graphite Publications, here: http://graphitepublications.com/a-tale-of-democracy-and-lions/

Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko. Photo by chavezcandanga via Flickr.

“I have some joke for you. A newspaper called Freedom of Speech was opened in Belarus. Its editor’s A.G. Lukashenko.” Dzianis Kuchynski is a student at European Humanities University (EHU), which moved from Belarusian capital, Minsk, to Vilnus in neighbouring Lithuania in 2004. He is Belarusian, but has had to cross the border in pursuit of a liberal arts education. The laughter that comes with his joke isn’t jolly, but tinged with bitterness. Then again, there’s little reason for cheeriness. Come this summer, Belarus would have been presided over by Alexander Lukashenko for nineteen years. There is little cause for celebration at EHU.

Many of Belarus’ neighbors have run to the European Union in search of capitalism, democracy and liberalism, but Lukashenko’s government has never sought to align itself with Brussels. Instead, it has chosen to head in another direction, with Minsk signing a Union State treaty with Moscow in 1997, detailing mutual commitments to entrenched social and economic ties between Belarus and Russia.

While Lukashenko bolstered his power with three elections (consecutively condemned by the international community for electoral fraud), markers of thriving civil liberties – such as competition in the press market and an education syllabus that allows deviations from Government demands – were stifled, just as their emergence seemed hopeful. Journalists also felt the force of Lukashenko’s iron grip over public information and debate in Belarus.

EHU opened in Minsk in 1992 as a liberal arts, not-for-profit centre for higher education. Securing foreign investment, and incorporating into its name the continent that EHU felt itself to be newly aligned with, the university was seen by many as an opportunity for a centre of free speech to thrive in Belarus, modeled after the universities in countries such such as Norway and Germany.

Trouble for EHU began in 2000, claimed its provost and founder Anatoli Mikhailov in an interview with the BBC’s Crossing Continents. Although support for Lukashenko was significant in 1994, by the general election in 2000, the President received next to no votes in the Minsk district around EHU. Mikhailov said that he was subsequently “invited for a chat” with the Education Minister, and was told to “choose anyone else to run the university” but himself. His forced resignation preceded the university’s closure in 2004 – with Mikhailov recounting that the Government “needed the premises”. According to Mihailov, President Lukashenko claimed personal responsibility for the closure, apparently saying, “This university was going to educate an elite to bring Belarus to the West… we do not need this university.”

Nastassia Yaromenka is at EHU too, and like Dzianis, she has known nothing but Lukashenko’s Belarus. Unike Dzianis though, she makes no joke about her situation. “I remember returning home late at night after ballet performance, tired, sleepy, and I was approached by policemen because they “found me strange” – no other reason. I simply was slowly walking, maybe slower than I was supposed to.” Nastassia pointed this out to highlight the inherent suspicion with which the regime views students. According to Dzianis, a sarcastic protest held last year, organized on Russian Facebook-equivalent VK, where participants congregated in town squares and slow-clapped the Lukashenko regime, has exacerbated tensions between police and students.

Both Nastassia and Dzianis were keen to stress that they were not political activists. These student experiences are not extremes, but part of a wider problem.

A lack of freedom of speech, self-regulation and plurality put Belarus 157th out of 179 countries on the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 2013 Press Freedoms Index, sandwiched between Azerbaijan and Egypt. Lukashenko, according to the RSF, stifles journalists to a larger extent than in Zimbabwe or Afghanistan, with independent press workers “remain(ing) at great risk whilst carrying out their duty of keeping the public informed.” Heather Blake is the chief of Reporters Without Borders UK, and also an Associate to the Changing Character of War Programme at Pembroke College, Oxford University. According to her, Belarus “is not North Korea, but you do have people trying to speak. (There is) a government stifling the voice of a population, and violating press freedoms is a sign of other violations.”

Lukashenko and his regime ignore or deny accusations that Belarus is run by a demagogue. The woman this writer spoke to at the Belarusian Telegraph Agency, a state media regulating company, suddenly lost her fluent English when press freedoms were mentioned – she suggested emailing instead to talk about the right to free speech. Consequently, this writer’s email never received a reply. The London embassy simply ignored any requests for comment.

Then again, this is a regime that is tired of justifying itself to the world. RSF’s Blake pointed out that “the UN… particularly Britain, are working as a collective voice along with NGOs to speak out against the problems” in Belarus, but noted also that individual states that take press freedoms seriously need to be joined by those that have more economic influence, like Russia. Moscow is notoriously difficult for other countries to pressure on anything related to authoritarian government – the Kremlin simply shrugged off accusations of its own electoral fraud in 2012 – and Russia’s deep political and economic ties with Belarus only serve to further stifle any opportunities for a relaxation of authoritarianism. Nonetheless, Blake hopes that “the attention currently on human rights violations can only mean more international pressure to respect civil liberties.”

Yet international pressure can have but a limited effect. The reality in Minsk is that opposition parties are disparate and have little support, partly because of the perceived conflicting policies which they advocate, a perception not least due to Lukashenko, who distorts opposition policies and attempts to arrest their proponents for ”hooliganism”. For example, Natalia Radzina, the editor of the Charter97 opposition website, had to flee the country to avoid a probable jail sentence.

Nastassia bemoans her education in Belarus. She tells how she “never heard a single positive word of support or understanding. We heard only complaints about our ignorance toward their rules and warnings about their power to influence the fact of our graduation.” She laments her nation’s future. “Most people don’t realise that they are oppressed, because they have never seen another way of life. I have a younger brother and sister, 8 and 9 years old, and I see how school kills their personalities. The government is raising slaves.”

The Belarusian state has made Minsk an inhospitable city for universities that do not tow the party line. Journalists flee abroad to avoid arrest. Children are not inspired in classrooms, and any attempt to break with convention is not seen as creative or innovative, but as deviant.

This year, Lukashenko’s smiling face appeared on Russia Today. Like Dzianis, Lukashenko had a “joke” to offer. “I say to journalists, alright, I have quite an autocratic style. Could you please try and see the good reasons for my system? I say to them, you’re very lucky to meet Europe’s last dictator.” Let us hope he’s right about the last three words.

Election day: the streets of Rawalpindi, Pakistan on May 11th 2013. Photo by olaf.kellerhoff via Flickr.

Pakistan has a horrible history of disenfranchising its own people. This year protests in Dhaka’s Shahbag Square brought back haunting memories of the atrocities that the Pakistan army and its collaborators committed in the country’s former eastern wing — atrocities that were committed just to deny East Pakistanis adequate political representation. This is a harrowing thought that makes one realize the lengths to which the state is willing to go to suppress its people. The Bengalis eventually got their freedom in 1971, but Pakistan never learned its lesson.

Marginalization of minorities has come to characterize Pakistan. The country had failed to take care of its Urdu-speaking immigrants from India (Mohajir), and hence the Mohajirs had to unite to form a political party of their own, drawing support from the under-represented middle classes of Pakistan’s largest metropolis, Karachi. After fighting armed street battles and fighting for political representation and acceptance, the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), now the Muttahidda Qaumi Movement, won control of Karachi and established itself as a national force to be reckoned with.

Pakistan has suffered immensely in the past five years, ironically, under the country’s first ever democratic government to complete its term. The government has failed to provide basic security, protection of life and property and economic prosperity. Most Pakistanis are happy that the government has left office and are looking forward to an election on May 11 2013 that could potentially change the fate of the nation. But what about the people of Balochistan? Can democracy end their plight?

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province by area, has been completely neglected by the state. It is rife with poverty and lacks basic infrastructure and development. Balochistan has faced the worst of state neglect and as a result insurgency has spread throughout the province and separatist nationalist movements have emerged. It is of extreme importance for the country to address the concerns of Balochistan, especially since the province has a deep sea port, a border with an increasingly important trade partner Iran, and is rich in resources.

Elections seem to be the solution for Pakistan. Some believe that they may not be the medicine for Balochistan’s problems. If history has taught us anything, we know that elections could not help the suppressed in the case of the Bengalis. They had no option but to create a separate nation. The previous democratic government has not been able to provide for Balochistan either. The government could not provide security as religious militants bombed the city of Quetta, targeting the Hazara Shia population and killing hundreds. Sardar Akhtar Mengal, leader of the Balochistan National Party (BNP), returned to Pakistan recently and was extremely critical of the government, commenting, “Democracy doesn’t mean anything for the people of Balochistan. We received more corpses during the tenure of the democratic government than during a dictatorship.” However, Sardar Mengal does plan to participate in the upcoming election, which goes to show that there is some prospect for Baloch reconciliation. Despite history not being on the side of the people, and the failure of the old political order, the Baloch should have some faith in democracy.

Today’s Pakistan is a new Pakistan. It is not the Pakistan that was formed in 1947 after the partition of India. That Pakistan died in 1971 when East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh. It is not the post-1971 Pakistan because that Pakistan died in 2013 when the first democratic government in history completed a full term in office. This new Pakistan was born in 2013 and it offers new hopes and promises. It may be asking too much of the Baloch people, but they must have faith in the new Pakistan.

The Baloch can learn from the example of the Mohajirs. The Mohajirs took control of the jugular vein of the country that is Karachi. The MQM has become one of Pakistan’s most important power brokers despite having only a small proportion of seats in Pakistan’s legislature. The Mohajirs today demand respect and representation because they can threaten to bleed the country if they are shoved aside, and on many occasions they have exercised their power.

Balochistan is an extremely vital province for the state. If the Baloch are able to take control of the Gwadar port, the gas supply that is likely to come in from Iran in 2014, and of the resource rich expanse, the empowered people will see economic prosperity. Full control of the province through democratic means will also mean that the Baloch, like the Mohajirs, will be holding a trigger to the head of Pakistan’s dominating political elite. This is the only way to impose a check on the power of those who have continued to neglect Balochistan. With economic prosperity and more regional autonomy, militant and separatist movements will be subdued. Balochistan will become a part of Pakistan’s political mainstream. It is true that Balochistan’s case is far more complex than it seems in this here. Nevertheless, empowering the people of the province and bringing it under state control would surely be the first step in solving these complexities.

Sharik Bashir studies at the University of Michigan. This article originally appeared on our partner website, Graphite Publications, here: http://graphitepublications.com/can-elections-save-the-baloch/