A soldier grips a Kalashnikov type rifle. ©iStockphoto.com/ RollingEarth

On February 18, 2010, Niger experienced its third military coup of the last two decades, as a group of army officers calling themselves the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) ousted incumbent President Mamadou Tandja from power. The response of the international community was mostly critical. Indeed only the US seemed to accord any value to the consensus view inside Niger: that the coup represents as much an opportunity for genuine democracy as it does a threat to the country.

Virtually every military junta that assumes power in a coup d’état cites worthy grounds for forcibly transforming the system of government of the state, though history teaches of a powerful tendency for such military governments to follow a path distinct from their stated intentions. Violence and economic collapse are the typical results and sub-Saharan Africa is rich with examples of such a pattern. Perhaps this explains why the international community was so quick to condemn the CSRD for assuming power in Niger.

But coups are not all the same, and whilst it is unsurprising that reports of another West African military coup evoked memories of some of the region’s notorious tyrants, there are grounds for cautious optimism for Niger under the interim leadership of the CSRD.

For a start, it is important to consider the nature of the regime ousted by the CSRD. Democratic rule disappeared from Niger long before Mamadou Tandja’s Presidential Palace came under military siege. In fact, democracy was lost when Tandja, the twice elected President of the Republic, undertook what Jibrin Ibrahim, an Abuja columnist for CDD, describes as a ‘civilian coup d’état’ over half a year earlier in May 2009.

Tandja’s ‘civilian coup’ involved his meddling with both the legislative and judicial bodies of the state: the former army colonel dissolved both the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court, in an effort to legitimate a third term in office. Both institutions had previously deemed a third term for Tandja illegal.

After dissolving these institutions and assuming emergency powers, Tandja organized a referendum for August 2009, putting the issue of a third term to the Nigerien people. The referendum did approve a third term for the incumbent, but opposition groups had boycotted the polls, complaining of malpractice. In the event, only 7% of voters turned up to the polling stations, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) force monitoring the vote. Not only did Tandja’s referendum violate the democratic process, his subversion of the legislative and judicial branches to the Presidency ensured that Niger would continue to be governed in an undemocratic manner.

Such was the state of Nigerien politics before the CSRD’s military coup in February of this year. The political opposition to Mamadou Tandja had no mechanism by which the Nigerien leader could have been democratically removed from power.

Taking these factors into consideration, a benevolent military coup represented one of a select few means of restoring democracy to Niger. Indeed, the very regime that Tandja had so potently undermined, the Nigerien Fifth Republic, owed its existence a similar coup, launched in 1999 against the undemocratic military regime of Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara. Perhaps this explains why the Co-ordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic (CFDR), a coalition of political parties, human rights groups and trade unions formed in opposition to Tandja’s antidemocratic reforms, so readily supported the CSRD’s intervention, organising thousands-strong demonstrations in support of the military junta. Insofar as the coup has offered at least an opportunity for the restoration of democracy, it is perceived by many Nigeriens as an improvement on the status quo since August 2009, the period in which Tandja effectively ruled the country as a dictator. As the BBC’s Caspar Leighton notes, “most people in…[the capital] Niamey, seem to regard the military coup as an opportunity [and] not a disaster”.

Looking down the barrel of a tank. ©iStockphoto.com/ CWLawrence

This being the case, the instant condemnation of the CSRD by the international community (excluding the US) reveals a failure to grasp the complexities of the situation in Niger, and in particular, to recognize that the coup represents an opportunity for, as much as it does a threat to, Nigerien democracy. Whilst in America the coup has been considered in the context of Tandja’s antidemocratic reforms, which State Department spokesman Philip Crowley was keen to point out “may well have…precipitated” military intervention in the country, the same cannot be said for the UN, the African Union (AU) and France, where the CSRD has been criticized. These institutions (and France) might instead have acknowledged that dialogue with the CSRD could be used to encourage the junta to undertake the democratic reforms that were promised upon their seizure of power. In a country devoid of a rich democratic tradition, the input of world experts in democratic constitution building by the UN may also have aided efforts for the restoration of democracy.

To a considerable extent, the international community has now begun to right its initial mistakes in dealing with the CSRD. In particular, regional bodies such as the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have engaged in detailed dialogue with power brokers in the CSRD.

As things stand, reports from Niamey indicate that the CSRD is making good progress in its efforts to rebuild democracy, and thus that Nigeriens may have experienced their second ‘benevolent’ military coup in just over a decade. Within a week of the coup, a civilian prime minister, Mahamadou Danda, had been appointed, and shortly afterwards, a transitional government was established. Indeed, the choice of prime minister itself demonstrates prudence by the CSRD, insofar as Danda was selected for his perceived experience and neutrality. In a further testimony to the integrity of the junta, an AU envoy to Niger, Albert Tevoedjre, announced in the last few weeks that the CSRD were looking after former President Mamadou Tandja well, describing his situation as that of “a political prisoner whose rights are respected”.

Additional grounds for optimism come from the junta’s public announcement that neither its own members, nor those of the interim government, would be permitted to run in the elections that have been promised by the CSRD. Equally encouraging are reports from those inside Niger explaining that efforts are firmly underway to establish a consultative forum, composed of various civil society actors, whereby a body will be created charged with the drafting of a new constitution and setting the timeframe for a return to democratic civilian government.  Talks between the CSRD and international institutions appear to have gone some way towards convincing these bodies of the junta’s good intentions, with Mohammed ibn Chambas, the President of ECOWAS, describing talks as “very encouraging”. Similarly, the UN Special Representative for West Africa, Said Djinnit, has, after meetings with the coup leaders, expressed his view that the junta is “very keen to return power to civilians”. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ordinary Nigeriens remain confident of a return to democracy.

It should not be forgotten that doubts remain over the integrity of the CSRD. At the time of writing, dates have yet to be set for a referendum on the adoption of a new constitution and for multiparty elections, despite the movement having been in control for over a month and a half. The CSRD, Nigerien civil society, and the international community should push for set dates as part of a drive for further progress in the restoration of democracy in the West African state. Perhaps most worrying, however, are suspicions of divisions within the junta – suspicions that have arisen out of the strong security measures that are taken by leaders of the CSRD at any public appearance. Such divisions, if they do indeed exist, may mean that the restoration of democracy is not unanimously supported by the members of the CSRD, and could therefore undermine efforts to return Niger to civilian rule.

Despite such concerns, initial signs indicate that the CSRD may represent a rare, if not non-existent, breed of military junta, one whose members are more concerned about the fate of the country than their own personal gain. Niger is a country with a long history of military rule, but the CSRD’s apparent desire to restore democracy gives grounds for supposing that popular rule has finally become an accepted norm of Nigerien society. The hoped-for result, a system of good governance, would give the Nigerien people a chance to address the problems that have made them the poorest in the world, according to the UNDP’s 2009 Human Development Report. All parties involved in the restoration process should thus look for a prompt and sustainable return to democracy.