Tariq Al-Hashimi, Iraq’s first vice-president, is under siege. Photo by NewsHours via Flickr.

Iraq is not in a good place. A year after the withdrawal of the last American combat troops, the country is as violent as ever; its ethnic and sectarian divides seem only to be deepening.

Although much of the international coalition’s efforts in Iraq resulted in failure, the one achievement that the 2003 invasion had to its credit, the institution of democracy, seems to be yielding few results. In fact, many suspect that the democratic process has been hijacked by Shi’ite factions within the nation and that the Iraqi state apparatus is becoming increasingly unrepresentative. Indeed, the secular opposition coalition, Al-Iraqiyya has been under increasing pressure from national security services; it has boycotted the parliament following the American withdrawal, citing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s attempts to exclude them from the political process.

Despite its democracy, however flawed, Iraq has failed to create an inclusive society. Political and social stability remain elusive. The example of Iraq casts a shadow over other attempts in Arab democracies and lends more credence to the idea that perhaps Arab states, internally divided, are unable to nurture open and free societies along a Western model.

The arrest warrant for the current first vice-president of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi, has been described by some as an attempt by the government to silence the opposition. It was issued the day after the last American troops departed: the circumstances are suspect. However, this example  highlights the sort of political factionalism present in Iraq. Hashimi fled to Iraqi Kurdistan in the north to escape arrest; the Kurdish regional government declined to hand him over to Baghdad.

In addition, Kurdish authorities allowed Hashimi to leave the country in order to meet with the Emir of Qatar, a staunch opponent of Shi’a Islam’s political influence in the region. Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to pursue its own interests over the central government’s signals its distrust of the Arab majority government and the provincial nature of the Iraqi state.

The difficulties that Iraq has faced since the introduction of democracy during the American invasion are not surprising or unexpected. However, the Iraqi government’s failure to contend with the challenges facing it has been exceptional.

Any peace brokered between religious factions has largely been a result of said factions managing to “cleanse” the neighbourhoods in which they operate; the privatisation of oil fields has not yielded tangible benefits for the common Iraqi; political corruption is as rife as ever; and the Kurdish administration remains at loggerheads with the central government.

In fact, since the American withdrawal, terrorists have found a new confidence: marketplace bombings have returned. Sunnis in Iraq have expressed concern that they are now being targeted by the government, whose security forces are quashing political expression. The opposition al-Iraqiyya coalition has attempted to foil the Shi’a-dominated government’s consolidation of power: it recently tried to bring it down with no-confidence motion, to trigger an election before the government became strong enough to win a majority.

The evolution of Iraq’s politics into partisan and sectarian conflict bodes badly for Arab democracy. The new governments of Libya and Egypt have already proven that democracy is no panacea for long held tribal and religious divisions. However, the Iraqi example has proven that democracy in the Arab world might itself be disruptive, promoting local identification, undermining the efficacy of government authority and encouraging the repression of those out of favour with the ruling party.

One can see this sentiment amongst the Alawites and Christians of Syria, some of whom support the Assad regime: they fear they would be targeted after a democratic revolution, just like their Sunni counterparts in Iraq. The current priorities of the Iraqi government and opposition comprise political posturing, the expansion of oil production, attempts to exclude opponents and appeals to foreign powers, most obviously Iran.

Democracy has done little to develop Iraq. Many of the projects currently mooted are primarily meant to appeal to the few Iraqis who are already well off. If Iraq were a model for Arab democracy, it would be a damning visage.

It is unfair to state that all Arab attempts at democracy will descend into the violent factional nightmare of Iraq. However, there seems to be a repetitive trend in the region: the tyranny of identity politics, political patronage and violence as a political tool. This has been evident in such states as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq itself.

Nonetheless, democracy in the Arab World is not a failed venture everywhere. Morocco presents a viable, if flawed, example. Tunisia and Libya seem to be developing increasingly civil and constructive political cultures, although they have not become fully-fledged liberal democracies. Recent violent incidents and the continued existence of independent armed militias attest to that fact. However, Iraq demonstrates that democracy, as just another system of governance, can beget just as much destruction, strife and animosity as the authoritarian systems that it may postdate.